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Abstract 
 
This paper is aimed to reveal the specific role and the quantitative impact of Military 
Industrial Complex (MIC) on the income inequality in accordance with the defense 
economy. For decades, there were assertions and discussions about MIC. However, there 
appear to be no existing researches on the numerical aspect of MIC. This study fills the 
gap by employing the dynamic panel data analysis for 24 countries for the period from 
2001 to 2014 with difference and system GMM. According to the literature, control 
variables such as indicators of major arms trade and terrorism incidents are selected. In 
order to see the impact on income inequality fairly, the dependent variables are chosen 
from the set of Theil’s T index based on the household final consumption, Gini coefficient 
and Human Development Index (HDI). Based on the empirical analysis, a negative 
relationship between MIC and income inequality is concluded, suggesting that an increase 
in MIC activity could reduce the income inequality. In addition, the number of terrorism 
incidents and the trade openness affects negatively while the amount of major arms trade 
has a positive relationship. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Military expenditure is an important issue for the international economy. It occupies a 
significant proportion of government budget, which prevents an opportunity cost 
including money and any resources from being alternatively employed for purposes that 
might directly improve the pace of development such as education. Yet, as Coulomb 
stated in her book Economic Theories Peace and War (2004), although the concept of 
peace and war itself was shared among economists from Friedrich List (1789 - 1846) and 
the German historical school to the Marxists, John Maynard Keynes (1883 - 1946) and 
his successors, the economic analysis of peace and war has been relatively weak than 
those in the philosophy due to the following historical reason. 
 
The orthodox economic science assumes that minimum government let individuals act on 
their own rationality. Peace follows automatically. Fundamental hypotheses that are 
 ‘peace is a normal situation’ and ‘economic development is the fundamental condition 
for a lasting peace’ (Coulomb 2004: 3) have been appealed in the dominant theory. 
Despite the fact, notable economists from mercantilists to nowadays econometricians 
have been tackling this issue. However, their thoughts are varied broadly. For example, 
the marcantilists assume that ‘military and economic conflicts are two interdependent 
facets of the same reality: the competition between two states on the international scene, 
to establish their power’. Meanwhile, the classical or neo-classical economists consider 
that ‘interstate conflicts on economic grounds result from a false comprehension by the 
ruling class of the real economic interest of their country. Only the military conflict can 
be legitimated but it is excluded from the economic field of analysis’. (Coulomb 2004: 3) 
This attitude roots in the nineteen-centuries’ marginalist who established ‘a ‘pure’ 
economic analysis, outside the historical context’ and aspired ‘to build a theoretical 
‘scientific’ system which would definitively guarantee the happiness of humanity. They 
suggest microeconomic methods of reasoning with little relevance to the analysis of wars 
and conflicts’. (Coulomb 2004: 56) This is the reason why economic analysis and debate 
has been relatively weak in defense economics. In the late twentieth century, game theory 
and econometrics developed the studies of war and military expenditures on the basis of 
the neo-classical theory.  
 
Specifically, this study contributes to the literature to investigate the relationship between 
military expenditure and income inequality econometrically, which is less studied even 
in defense economy, in particular, incorporating the MIC role that is considered 
descriptively in the past. Therefore, the aims of this paper are (1) clarifying the MIC 
concept and its role and (2) quantifying the impact of MIC in the relationship of military 
spending and income inequality. Especially, the importance lies on the second point since 
this paper tries to fill the gap from the qualitative to the quantitative analysis on the MIC 
impact in defense economy. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 of the paper presents the literature 
review including the concept of MIC, frameworks and hypothesis. Section 3 introduces 
the model and methodology while section 4 discusses the empirical result. Finally, section 
5 concludes. 
  
2. Literature review 
 
Based on the above historical thought in defense economy, recent empirical work is 
briefly categorized into four theoretical frameworks. (Dunne and Nikolaidou 2012) First 
is the traditional Keynesian framework. The government make good use of military 
expenditure to boost output through multiplier effects when the effectiveness of aggregate 
demand is limited. (Dunne 1996) Higher military expenditure leads to an increase in 
capacity utilization, demand, profits and employment in the economy if aggregate 
demand is relatively low compared to potential supply. One disadvantage of this theory 
is that it fails to consider supply side issues such as positive and negative externalities. 
Smith and Smith (1980) extended this approach for analyzing the relationship of 
economic growth by including production function. Regarding inequality, it benefits the 
poor relatively more and improves income distribution. (Tongur & Elveren 2015) 
 
Second is the Neoclassical framework. The state tries to maximize national utility by 
considering the best trade-off between opportunity costs and security benefits of military 
expenditure. (Dunne and Nikolaidou 2012) It assumes that defense spending as a pure 
public good and national interest for protection. Many researchers conducted empirical 
works within this theory. Aizenman and Glick (2006) employed the Barro (1988) model 
in economic growth field which explicitly allows for forms of government expenditure, 
financed by taxes, which can influence output through the production function and has an 
explicit utility function for the representative agent, which the government maximizes. 
(Dunne 2005) They consider that output is influenced by security, military expenditure 
relative to the thread to find the negative relationship: when the threat is low, military 
expenditure reduces output and vice versa. Dunne (2011) also found that the negative 
relationship by employing the augmented Solow model with Harrod-neutral technical 
progress. In the context of income inequality, the state whose military spending is high 
has fewer funds for social expenditures such as education (opportunity cost). Hence, there 
may exist a trade-off between social welfare and defense.  
 
 Thirdly, the Marxists approach. Baran and Sweezy suggested the underconsumptionist 
approach in their famous book, Monopoly Capital in 1966, which sees military spending 
as a crucial device to hinder crisis occurring, by letting the absorption of surplus without 
increasing wages, unlike other forms of government spending, and so maintaining profits. 
(Dunne and Skons 2011) Therefore, military expenditure benefits to economic growth 
when it is assumed that economy disequilibrium exists. 
 
Their view is closely related to the last framework, Institutional approach, which 
introduces the concept of Military Industrial Complex (MIC). In the 1970s, Marxists 
shared the idea that the MIC represents only a very temporary solution to capitalist 
economic stagnation. (Coulomb 2004) The capitalist economy whose nature is 
overproducing leads to permanent arms economy. Michael Kidron (1970) pointed out that 
the military expenditure was a key to capitalism’s success after 1945. Here, MIC’s 
inefficiency plays a positive role because the primal goal is the prevention of economy’s 
overheating by military spending, where military expenditure is wasteful. Thus, MIC has 
a motivation to emphasize international conflicts and to try to prevent others from solving 
friction with non-military ways. (Dunne 1990; Howard and King 2014) Along with this 
theory, it can be presumed that payment in military-related industries is better than other 
sectors as long as military expenditure increases. The gap between sectors will rise (Ali 
2007) or there may be different impacts on the wage discrepancy between unskilled and 
skilled labor in R&D personnel. (Lin and Ali 2009) 
 
Compared to traditional Keynesian and neoclassical framework, there are fewer studies 
in defense economy by institutional approaches in literature, particularly as to inequality. 
Even those are mostly descriptive than analytic since the concept of MIC is rather 
polemical. One major criticism is that it is of no use to understand the interactions 
between the economy and the military sector because it is unsuitable for the study of 
dynamic effects and difficult to empirically reveal the MIC’s real influence on military 
waste. (Coulomb 2004) Hence, this article is an initial step towards such an integration. 
That is, the contributions of this study are (1) providing a comprehensive explanation of 
MIC role, (2) casting a new light on the institutional framework for econometric method; 
difference and system GMM on panel data in the relationship between inequality and 
 military spending to measure the impact of MIC and (3) using the most recent dataset 
which is available at the end of 2015. 
 
Military Industrial Complex: Definition and characteristics 
The first public use of the term was by the Union of Democratic Control, formed by Sir 
Charles Trevelyan in the United Kingdom on 5th August 1914. Point Four of their pacifist 
manifesto declared: “4. National armaments should be limited by mutual agreement, and 
the pressures of the military-industrial complex regulated by the nationalization of 
armaments firms and control over the arms trade.” And the concept has gotten widely 
known by the speech when 34th president of United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
resigned.  
 
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist.” (January 17th 1961) 
 
He denounced the danger of the growing reinforcement of the MIC’s power in the US, 
resulting from the unprecedented increase in military staff and armament industries, 
which was likely to question democratic methods. (Coulomb 2004) Its concept nowadays 
has been expanded to include academia, entertainment and creative industry.  
In 1971, Charles Wolf, Jr. suggested that the military industrial complex is composed of 
three separate entities: the military, the defense industry, and portions of the government 
responsible for military affairs in his book, The Military Industrial Complex: A 
Reassessment. It consists of the Department or Ministry of Defense, pressure groups in 
Parliament or Congress, the armament manufacturers, the army’s prescribers, and 
specialized, notably academic research institutions. Wolf sums up his conception of the 
MIC succinctly: "The reality of the MIC is complex not simple, pluralistic not monolithic, 
sometimes effective and potent, sometimes ineffective and impotent, no less motivated 
by concern for national interests than its critics, nor less motivated by a mixture of other 
motives than its critics." (Steinbach 2009; Mills 1999) Steinbach (2009) analyzes each 
link among those sectors based on Wolf’s and Seth G. Jones (1972- ): 
  
“Procurement agencies in many countries, especially the U.S. Department 
of Defense, often enjoy near or complete monopsonistic status: their 
decisions as consumers directly affect the price and quantity of goods 
offered by defense firms. As such, the nature of their demand determines 
in large part the make up of the market for defense technologies, including 
what is produced and who gets to sell it. In turn, constrained by 
procurement decisions, the defense industry plays a critical role in 
defining the capabilities of a state's military. “… “Thus, a country's ability 
to respond to international crises in accordance with its foreign policy 
goals rests in large part on the military's ability to project force beyond 
its borders, which in turn relies on the production of technologies by the 
defense industry, which in turn accommodates the policy needs of the 
procurement bureaucracy.” 
 
As the national government plays a role as a monopolistic buyer and tends to protect the 
arms industry, no real competitive market for weapon systems is created, and gradually, 
the interdependence between government and industry increases. This does not suggest 
that there is no competition between companies. Oppositely, companies are in an 
intensive competition to gain the small number of very large deals granted by their own 
or foreign governments. (Skons and Dunne 2011) 
Even if the concept of the MIC is rather controversial, many economists acknowledge 
that the military sector’s specificity limits internal competition, favors a rise in costs, 
sometimes with the pressure of influential networks which are not willing to reach an 
economic optimum. (Coulomb 2004) Thus, the concept itself is not only interpreted as 
Marxist suggested.  
 
Relationships between military expenditure and income inequality: three hypothesis 
Even the limited existing literature has failed to result in a scholarly consensus on the 
relationship between military expenditure and income inequality. There are three types 
of different hypothesis; Inequality-narrowing hypothesis, Inequality-widening hypothesis 
 and neutrality hypothesis according to Wolde-Rufael (2015). (Abell 1994; Ali 2007; Lin 
and Ali 2009; Wolde-Rufael 2014, 2015) 
The inequality-narrowing hypothesis is that the higher income in the military related 
sector is enabled by the bigger military spending, which leads to a high-level of aggregate 
demand and employment that allows the poor gain more relatively. Particularly, it is true 
in the situation where the military industry is labor-intensive and arms production is home 
grown. (Ali 2007; Lin and Ali 2009; Wolde-Rufael 2014) It is considered that less 
military expenditure enables the government to allocate more budget to social welfare 
such as education and social benefit that improves income dispersion. (Ali 2007; Lin and 
Ali 2009; Elveren 2012; Wolde-Rufael 2014) In his study, Ali (2012) found that there 
was a negative and strong military spending’s effect on income inequality in Middle 
Eastern and North African countries over the period 1987-2005 with panel regression. 
Additionally, a positive trade-off relationship between military expenditure and 
spendings of education and health over 1988-2005 was shown by GMM panel data 
analysis of 29 OECD countries according to Lin, Ali and Lu (2015). 
 
The inequality-widening hypothesis is that if the military industry is technology intensive 
that shifts production towards skilled labor, the difference could be magnified between 
relatively well-paid skilled workers in the military industry and less skilled labor force in 
the non-military sector. Hence, it worsens the income inequality. (Ali 2007; Lin and Ali 
2009; Wolde-Rufael 2014) The role of MIC accelerates this income dispersion because it 
favors the higher military expenditure than the appropriate one in this sense. Moreover, 
higher military expenditure crowds out the spending for other social welfare that benefits 
the less-off. The military expenditure at the expense of other welfare hinders the income 
distribution through transfer payments. (Ali 2007; Elveren 2012; Wolde-Rufael 2014) 
Especially, health and education benefit the human capital which is an important factor 
of income inequality. Therefore, the higher the military expenditure is, the more 
exacerbating the income inequality gets. (Ali 2007; Elveren 2012; Wolde-Rufael 2014) 
It is also explained by the Opportunity Cost Burden Effect model Vadlamannati (2008) 
postulates. It argues that the military spending drains out the resources from public 
spending that encourages social and human capital development and reduce income 
inequality. The figure 1 from the Vadlamannati (2008) paper pictures the mechanism of 
 military sector growth influence on the income inequality and social and human 
development in an economy at the expense of diminishing returns to social development 
sectors. After the point P2, the slope of the development spending is sharper than the one 
before P2, which means the opportunity cost of military spending is abandoned since it 
substitutes development expenditure to the military sector growth by their funding request. 
Thus, if the military burden is smaller, the total net effect on economic growth is positive, 
and the government allocates resources to development spendings that lead to lower 
income inequality.  Or, the diversion to military expenditure is strong enough to decrease 
the positive net effect and force to increase income inequality.  
 
 Figure 1: Opportunity Cost Burden Effect (Vadlamannati 2008) 
 
In addition, if the middle-class households are taxed disproportionately in order to fund 
military spending, the post-tax income might commit to impair the income distribution. 
(Ali 2007; Ali 2011; Hirnissa, Habibullah, and Baharom 2009; Wolde-Rufael 2014) 
Many authors discovered the empirical results suggesting the inequality-widening 
hypothesis. Abell (1994), Kentor, Jorgenson and Kick (2012), Tongur and Elveren (2015) 
and Vadlamannati (2008) found the positive relationship between military expenditure 
and income inequality by panel data analysis. Supportively, Ali (2011) found that the 
high-income inequality results in the lower educational expenditure. Some authors 
focusing on one country due to the problem of homogeneity in panel data analysis also 
discovered that a one-way Granger causality from military spending to income inequality; 
 Elveren (2012) for Turkey, Hirnissa, Habibullah, and Baharom (2009) for Malaysia, 
Meng, Lucyshyn, and Li (2015) for China, Wolde-Rufael (2014; 2014) for Taiwan and 
for South Korea. 
 
Lastly, the neutrality hypothesis is that as long as the military labor does not occupy a 
significant part of the whole labor force, and the military expenditure does not fill up a 
major part of total government expenditure, the impact of military spending is small, so 
that there is no significant effect on income inequality. It is also the case if the government 
gives equally ample scope to spending on social welfare.  
The empirical evidence from Lin and Ali (2009) suggested no evidence of causality in 
any direction for a panel data with 58 countries through panel homogeneous non-causality 
test.  Hirnissa, Habibullah, and Baharom (2009) also did not find an effective relationship 
for a panel data of Indonesia, Philippines, India and South Korea. As to South Korea, 
their result, that is no one-way or two-way causality, is the opposite result of the one 
Wolde-Rufael (2014) found, which is not only the positive relationship in a long-run and 
short-run, but the unidirectional causality from military expenditure to income inequality 
due to the different methodology and data. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
The panel data analysis over 22 countries by the system GMM with the time period from 
2001 to 2014 is employed in this research. As Dunne (2011) pointed out, the interpretation 
of the sign of a relationship by using Granger causality methods is dubitable unless there 
is an identified structural model and the evidence of the non-military variables’ grandness. 
The non-military variables are selected from the point of view of the empirical studies on 
income inequality. 
 
 
3.1 Data 
The 11 variables are utilized in this study for 22 countries, which are selected by the data 
availability of SIPRI arm producing companies. (Table 1) 
  
 Label Variables Source Number of Observation
GINI 
Gini coefficient (WIID_ver3_sept15_0, All the Ginis, 
1950-2012 (updated in Autumn 2014): Branko L. 
Milanovic and WB database) 
WIID 
269 World Bank 
database 
THEIL 
Theil's T index based on the household final 
consumption expenditure (PPP) at the current 
international USD and total population among 137 
countries 
World Bank 
database 336 
HDI Human Development Indicator from Human Development Report (2003-2015) UNDP 312 
APCSALE Top 100 Sales of arm producing company (2002-2014) SIPRI 336 
TIVNET Net export of Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices. (2000-2014) SIPRI 336 
TERROR Number of terrorism incidents 
Global 
Terrorism 
Database 
336 
HEALTHGOV Percentage of the health expenditure on the total government expenditure 
World Bank 
database 312 
GDP Real GDP at current price World Bank database 336 
TRADEOPEN Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product 
World Bank 
database 334 
UNEMP Unemployment rate out of total labor force (% modeled ILO estimate) 
World Bank 
database 336 
NASA Dummy variable for countries belong to NATO NATO 336 
Table 1: Dataset 
 
3.1.1 MIC variable 
As the measure of MIC variable, the data of The top 100 arms-producing and military 
services companies in the world (excluding China) from 2002 to 2014 are taken from 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). APCSALE indicates the total 
sales of arm producing companies, categorized by each country and time. APCSALE are 
taken into account the numbers of the previous year if they exist. The number in Finland 
2010 is an appropriate example. Though the column number in RANK shows zero, but 
there is 660 in the APCSALE column, which means the only ranked company, Patria 
 Industries is the 105th in 2010, that is out of the top 100, but in 2011, it is the 98th, so 
that there is also the 2010’s sales figure. Hence, the sales in 2010 is put in 660. 
 
3.1.2 Inequality measure 
There are three alternative variables, THEIL, GINI and HDI. THEIL stands for Theil’s T 
based on the household final consumption expenditure (PPP) at the current international 
USD and total population among 137 countries by World Bank Database (WB) from 2001 
to 2014. Theil’s T statistic is considered as the family of generalized uncertainty 
inequality measure with decomposition of within-groups and between-groups’ 
components. The formula of the between-groups component is as following: 
 
Theil ൌ 	෍ݕ௜ݕ logቌ
ݕ௜ݕ
௜ܰܰ
ቍ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
where n is the number of countries in the sample, ݕ௜ is the household final consumption 
expenditure in country i  (i=1,2,…,n) and y  is the total household final consumption 
expenditure of the sample. Ν	and ௜ܰ  represent the total population and population of 
country i. Theil statistics measure the deviation of the household final consumption across 
countries in the sample, not the household income inequality. Ali (2004; 2007) uses the 
Theil’s T statistics taken from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) with 
measures computed for 160 countries over period 1987 to 1997. The base data are 
composed of the employment share and average relative income, capturing the dispersion 
of industrial pay inequality around the world. On the contrary, this study uses the 
household final consumption expenditure because of the latest and comprehensive data 
compared to the UTIP data which covers until 2008. PPP is widely used to compare the 
income levels in different countries, adjusted by the exchange rate. THEIL, thus, implies 
the dispersion of income level among 137 countries, which could be the one of 
alternatives for inequality measures. Germany, Japan and US show the higher level. 
Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine displays antithetically. Interestingly, Russia exhibits the 
increasing slope which is similar but weak in Turkey. (Figure 2) 
 
  
Figure 2: Time trends of Theil’s T in sample countries 
 
GINI stands for the Gini coefficient that is known as the statistical dispersion intended to 
represent the nation’s household income distribution, developed by Corrado Gini in 1912. 
If the coefficient expresses zero, it means the perfect equality, where everybody has the 
same income. The larger the value gets, the bigger the inequality becomes. The data in 
this paper is taken from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), Milanovic’s 
dataset which is updated in 2014 and WB. The Gini coefficients of each country are 
shown in the figure 3. The highest average Gini coefficient in the sample is South Africa, 
66.6 and the second is Brazil, 54.6. Not surprisingly, the lowest is Sweden, 25.4. Though 
there are some missing values, it is assumed that no dramatic improvement happened 
during the sample period from 2001-2014. Wolde-Rufael (2014) used Gini coefficient of 
South Korea from 1965 to 2011 and found the negative relationship between military 
expenditure and income inequality by the Granger causality method. 
 
  
Figure 3: Time trends of Gini coefficients in sample countries 
 
The last alternative variable is HDI, that is Human Development Index, created by United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). HDI literally expresses the human 
development outcomes where different countries have the same Gross National Income 
(GNI). For example, the Malaysia’s GNI is higher than Chile’s, but the life expectancy 
and the expected years of schooling in Malaysia are 7 years and 2.5 years shorter than the 
ones in Chile respectively. Chile has the much higher HDI value than Malaysia in this 
case. (UNDP) Overall, HDI implies that the income levels, taking into account the values 
which are considered as the living standard.  Norway has the highest average HDI over 
the sample period while India has the opposite. (Figure 4) 
Comparing those three indicators, Gini and HDI shows similar tendency which is that the 
developed countries, particularly Northern countries, having the rich social welfare 
system such as Norway and Sweden are categorized as less inequality countries, but the 
developing countries such as Brazil and South Africa is contrary. It is taken as granted 
since HDI partially includes Gini. Due to the base data’s difference, Theil’s T which is a 
relative comparison between groups comparison, not an absolute measure presents 
 somewhat oppositely. Thus, using three measures as comparison would serve to check 
the model stability. 
 
Figure 4: Time trends of HDI in sample countries 
 
3.1.3 Indicators of military activities 
TIVNET is created to measure arms trade, based on the international transfer of major 
weapons by SIPRI. There is another alternative measure such as observations categorized 
as 93 in HS code without re-import and re-export regardless of the sizes, but it includes 
all arms and ammunitions, which is not necessarily for the military purpose. Russia and 
US are the bigger exporters. On the other hand, the importer is India. (Table 2; Figure 5) 
  
  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Australia -764.07 353.86 -1440.00 -279.00 
Brazil -210.36 145.36 -630.00 -35.00 
Canada -36.71 162.13 -408.00 148.00 
Finland -43.07 71.11 -183.00 34.00 
France 1652.71 442.79 808.00 2334.00 
Germany 1603.50 757.64 790.00 3175.00 
India -2706.96 1338.95 -5555.00 -1142.00 
Israel 100.93 460.24 -723.00 640.00 
Italy 319.71 328.88 -202.00 861.00 
Japan -439.79 104.37 -688.00 -273.00 
Netherlands 328.71 296.46 -11.00 970.00 
Norway -160.93 256.57 -525.00 109.00 
Poland -215.21 226.57 -852.00 45.00 
Russia 6190.57 1247.81 5094.00 8545.00 
Singapore -618.93 429.45 -1491.00 -65.00 
South Africa -119.07 257.61 -755.00 93.00 
South Korea -849.36 467.24 -1501.00 56.00 
Spain 270.64 490.15 -266.00 1255.00 
Sweden 392.21 162.90 96.00 749.00 
Switzerland 192.25 111.26 46.00 443.00 
Turkey -674.79 348.50 -1346.00 -215.00 
UK 607.21 406.15 -18.00 1453.00 
USA 6559.64 1350.47 4450.00 9613.00 
Ukraine 524.79 307.22 198.00 1450.00 
Total 495.99 2033.09 -5555.00 9613.00 
*Note: Unit is million USD at 1990 prices 
Table 2: Mean, standard deviation, min and max of TIVNET 
 
  
Figure 5: Time trends of TIVNET in sample countries  
 
3.1.4 Potential determinants in income inequality 
In accordance with the existing literature, this study also concerns a large number of 
possible determinants in income inequality. A brief overview is provided below. 
TERROR represents the incidents of terrorism which occurred in each year based on the 
Global Terrorism Database by the University of Maryland.  Aizenman and Glick (2006) 
found that when the threat is low, military spending decreases output and vice versa. This 
relationship is prone to remain in the countries where more corruption exists. (Dunne 
2005) 
HEALTHGOV is the health expenditure shares out of the government spending by WB. 
As the inequality-widening hypothesis suggests, there may exist the expenditure trade-
off between on military and on social welfare. It is selected to capture the crowd-out effect 
which is caused by that trade-off. 
Trade openness is the other important factor in defense economy. It is considered that a 
more open economy will represent bigger arms trade. Positive and negative effects are 
found in the economic growth theory in relation with military spending, and its impact is 
 also disputable. (Edwards 1998; Frankel and Romer 1999; Dollar and Kraay 2004; 
Yanikkaya 2003; Yakovlev 2007; Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000; Dunne and Tian 2013) 
Other important determinants introduced to this paper along with the research of income 
inequality are the real GDP and the unemployment rate, which are named LNRGDP and 
LNUNEMP respectively. (Hasman et al. 2015) It is worth that taking into account only 
the military-related variables, but also other variables related to the existing literature in 
the income inequality study. 
NATO indicates the dummy variable for countries belonging to NATO at the date when 
this research is carried out. It may be assumed to be less important compared to other 
indicators, so it is treated separately in the empirical results. 
 
3.1.5 Outliers 
Note that in terms of outliers, variables are treated by the logarithm transformation in 
order to reduce variation except for those which dramatically drop their observation, taken 
logarithm and for dummy variables. For example, TIVNET drops almost half of its 
observation since it contains negative values. It is precarious that to eliminate outliers 
outside of inner fence or outer fence or to reduce volatility with transformation by binning 
or taking logarithm because they may carry the important information, especially, in this 
study, it is considered to be left due to the limited number of observations over all. Hence, 
in the empirical part, both results with and without logarithm transformation are reported. 
The variable names attached LN in front hereinafter means the ones taken by logarithm. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
It is employed that dynamic panel method with the significant lagged effects of the 
dependent variable. There are two common transformations, “the first-difference” and 
“(forward) orthogonal deviations”. (Arellano and Bover 1995) The latter transformation 
is chosen in this paper by reason of the unbalanced panel data.  
Firstly, the regression specification is as follows: 
 
ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ ൌ	∝ 	൅	ߚܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ିଵ ൅ 	γ ௜ܺ௧ ൅	ߜ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௧ 
where 
ߝ௜௧ ൌ 	ߤ௜ ൅ ߥ௜௧ 
  
The subscripts i and t denote countries and years. Dependent variable as income 
inequality is applied by (1) Gini coefficient, (2) Theil’s T based on PPP(THEIL) and (3) 
HDI. The income inequality is considered to be sticky, which is closely examined below, 
so that the right-hand side includes the first lag of the dependent variable.  X is the set of 
independent variables which is listed in Table 1, excluding the above three variables. δ 
are year dummies that is introduced to eliminate universal time-related shocks from the 
errors, ߤ௜ are the unobserved country specific fixed-effects, and ߥ௜௧ are the identically and 
independently distributed (i.i.d) error terms. It is obvious that the estimation by Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) is biased and inconsistent because its basic assumption is violated 
due to the correlations between the dependent variable and ߤ௜ and also between the first 
lag of dependent variable and ߤ௜. Hence, the first differencing specification is necessary 
to deal with this problem: 
 
∆ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ ൌ	∝ 	൅	ߚ∆ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߛ∆ ௜ܺ௧ ൅	ߜ௧ ൅	∆߭௜௧ 
 
∆ means the first difference operator. Although this transformation diminishes ߤ௜, it still 
biased downwards since the lagged dependent variable is endogenous by the correlation 
between ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ିଵ  in ∆ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ିଵ  and ߭௜௧ିଵ  in ∆߭௜௧ . To 
be precise, not only the lagged dependent variable, but any predetermined explanatory 
variables that are not strictly exogenous would be potential endogenous because of the 
corresponding correlation with ߭௜௧ିଵ. In addition to that, if the target panel is unbalanced, 
the first-differencing amplifies the gaps. Hence, orthogonal deviations are considered, 
which subtract the mean of all future accessible observations of a variable. It diminishes 
data loss because it is possible to calculate for all observations but for the last of each, 
that are usable as instruments by no lagged observations entering the formula. The 
specific transformation is in such a way when ω is a variable. 
 
߱௜,௧ାଵୄ ≡ ඨ ௜ܶ௧ሺ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ 1ሻ ൭߱௜௧ െ
1
௜ܶ௧
෍߱௜௦
௦வ௧
൱ 
 
 where ௜ܶ௧ is the number of available future observations. Note that as long as the ߱௜௧ are 
independently distributed before transformation, they go on consequently. Moreover, this 
feature lasts when ߱௜௧ is i.i.d. (Roodman 2009) 
 
In order to cope with the endogeneity problem, a generalized method of moment (GMM) 
is suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), which includes OLS and the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) as special cases. 2SLS is the simplest way to deal with, but it cannot be a 
good estimator under heteroscedasticity, which feasible GMM regards it by modelling 
well-structured error term in an efficient and better-behaved way. GMM estimator is 
based on a matrix of instruments structured with the exogenous variables and with subsets 
of the lagged values of the levels of dependent variables, and of the levels of the 
endogenous variables. (difference GMM) According to Bond et al., (2001), when it is 
considered that there is a strong persistence in the examined time series, which means it 
is close to a random walk or when the cross-section variability overwhelms time 
variability much, the difference GMM estimator becomes weak or the regressors become 
poor instruments for transformed variables because past levels carry little information of 
future changes. To overcome this problem, the augmented version of difference GMM, 
called as system GMM is proposed. (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) 
The advantage of system GMM is that it obtains efficiency by using a lagged endogenous 
variable among the exogenous ones to control for the dynamics of adjustment. It allows 
fewer time span and lots of individuals as well as some endogenous variables and fixed 
effects, coping with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. (Roodman 2009; Tongur and 
Elveren 2015) 
 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) and the Fisher-type (Choi 2001) Augmented-Dickey Fuller 
unit root test is applied in order to check the stationarity in our unbalanced panel data. 
The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit roots and the alternative ones are that 
some panels are stationary and at least one panel is stationary (N is finite) respectively. 
Table 3 shows the results conducted on each three income inequality variable as a 
dependent variable. In the Fisher-type test, the inverse chi-squared p-value (P) is for the 
finite number of panels and the others, where Z, L*, and Pm stand for the inverse normal, 
the inverse logit t, and the modified inverse chi-squared p-value respectively, are valid 
 for the finite and infinite number of panels. Although the Im-Pesaran-Shin test is not 
available for GINI and LNGINI due to the insufficient time period, at the five percent 
significant level, the null hypothesis can be hold. For LNTHEILT, the values of P and 
Pm are rejected by the five percent significant level, but together with Im-Pesaran-Shin 
test and the values Z and L* in Fisher-type test, it can be judged as carrying unit roots in 
itself. It is appropriate to stick to the assumption that all panels contain unit roots for 
THEILT, LNTHEILT, HDI and LNHDI. Therefore, difference GMM is applied for GINI 
and LNGINI while system GMM is suitable and a proper methodology to be conducted 
for THEILT, LNTHEILT, HDI and LNHDI. (Table 3) 
 
  Im-Pesaran-Shin test  Fisher-type test 
Dependent variable 1 lagged value 2 lagged value  1 lagged value 2 lagged value
GINI  N/A* N/A* P 0.0011 N/A**
  Z 0.0204 N/A**
  L* 0.0005 N/A**
  Pm 0.0001 N/A**
LNGINI  N/A* N/A* P 0.0012 N/A**
  Z 0.0170 N/A**
  L* 0.0005 N/A**
  Pm 0.0002 N/A**
THEILT  0.9509 0.9932 P 0.1869 0.9852
  Z 0.9706 0.9998
  L* 0.9242 0.9999
  Pm 0.1925 0.9724
LNTHEILT  0.7515 0.8328 P 0.0051 0.001
  Z 0.7912 0.9652
  L* 0.4003 0.6378
  Pm 0.0016 0.0001
HDI  1.0000 1.0000 P 1.0000 1.0000
  Z 1.0000 1.0000
  L* 1.0000 1.0000
  Pm 1.0000 1.0000
LNHDI  1.0000 1.0000 P 1.0000 1.0000
  Z 1.0000 1.0000
   L* 1.0000 1.0000
     Pm 1.0000 1.0000
*N/A*: Insufficient number of time periods     
**N/A**: Insufficient number of observations     
 Table 3: Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type ADF unit root tests 
 
4. Empirical Result 
 
The empirical results based on the difference GMM and system GMM analysis of the 
unbalanced panel data with regard to the relationship between MIC and income inequality 
by Stata are shown at Table 4. AR (1) is used to capture the stickiness by Arellano-Bond 
test. LNRGDP, TIVNET and LNAPCSALE are treated as exogenous variables while 
LNHELTHGOV, TERROR, LNUNEMP, LNTRADEOPEN are considered not strictly 
exogenous. All of the results are significant either or both Sargan and Hansen test at the 
ten percent significant level. 
Although the two-step efficient difference GMM performs better than one-step for the 
estimated coefficient with lower bias and standard errors which are also exact in the 
difference GMM according to Windmeijer (2005), one-step estimations are reported as 
well for the comparison. To make the results robust to the heteroscedasticity and arbitral 
autocorrelation patterns within individuals in one-step GMM and to conduct Windmeijer 
correction in two-step GMM, syntax robust are added. Additionally, small for small-
sample corrections and orthogonal for the orthogonal transformation are added. 
(Roodman 2009) It is indicated that (1) to (8) for Gini coefficient, (9) to (16) for Theil’s 
T of PPP and (17) to (24) are for HDI with each logarithm as dependent variables. The 
even number results are run with NATO variable. 
 
At the ten percent significant level, AR (1) is rejected and AR (2) is not for (1), (2), (5), 
(6), (9), (10), (13), (14), (17), (18) and (19). Others are violated. Looking at the even 
number’s results, none of the NATO coefficient is significant. Thence, it is worth to note 
that the effectiveness of NATO is not highly imperative in this study.  
The significant coefficients of LNAPCSALE, TERROR, TIVNET and LNTRADEOPEN 
are stable by Wald test. Taking a close look at the above results, LNAPCSALE is 
negatively significant at the five percent level for GINI and LNGINI and at the ten percent 
 level for THEILT on the one-step GMM. The MIC activity impacts negatively on the 
income inequality measured as Gini coefficient, that is, the inequality-narrowing 
hypothesis is supported. When the dependent variable is taken as Theil’s T index, it 
suggests the inequality-narrowing hypothesis too. Yet, the statement on Gini coefficient 
is plausible because not only the one conducted on the logarithm of Theil’s T on the one-
step system GMM is not significant, but the significance level on the Theil’s T one-step 
is weaker. This inequality-narrowing finding matches Ali (2013) and Lin, Ali and Lu 
(2013) who found by panel data GMM regression. 
 
The coefficient of TERROR has weak but significantly positive effect on models for HDI 
both on the one- and two-step GMM. The more terrorism incidents happen, the better 
HDI gets. It seems counterintuitive, but if one takes into account the income-narrowing 
hypothesis, which is explained as a higher aggregate demand and employment that allows 
the poor gain more relatively in the labor-intensive surroundings and home-based arms 
production, the frequency of terrorism induces more arms productions, which results in 
conversing income inequality. TIVNET has positive and significant impact on Theil’s T 
while LNTRADEOPEN is the opposite. Literally, as the arms trade increases, the income 
inequality increases, but as the country is more open to trade, the income inequality 
decreases. The explanation to the former realization is similar in accordance with the 
income-narrowing hypothesis which is home grown in particular. The more trade reduces 
the sales of home-based arms producing industry. The latter is explained along with the 
existing literature because it is not the military related, but the general transaction, which 
is trade reduces inequality. The first lags of dependent variable fairly describe the current 
occurrence in the Theil’s T and HDI models. 
   Difference GMM 
 One-step  Two-step  One-step Two-step 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
L.gini -0.0547 -0.0547 -0.2620 -0.2620  
 (0.0984) (0.0988) (0.5993) (0.6015)  
L.lngini    -0.0220 -0.0220 -0.0857 -0.0857
    (0.0996) (0.0999) (.) (.)
nato  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
  (.) (.)  (.) (.)
lnhealthgov -1.9419 -1.9419 15.2575 15.2575  -0.0658 -0.0658 0.8179** 0.8179**
 (3.5152) (3.5280) (11.6548) (11.6973)  (0.1151) (0.1155) (0.3104) (0.3115)
terror 0.0024 0.0024 0.0114 0.0114  0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0222) (0.0223)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (.) (.)
lnrgdp -2.2725 -2.2725 -11.3568 -11.3568  -0.0729 -0.0729 -0.0760 -0.0760
 (2.6953) (2.7051) (7.5813) (7.6089)  (0.0790) (0.0793) (.) (.)
tivnet 0.0005 0.0005 0.0017 0.0017  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (.) (.)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnapcsale -1.2436** -1.2436** 9.5466 9.5466  -0.0369** -0.0369** 0.1189 0.1189
 (0.5421) (0.5441) (8.8114) (8.8435)  (0.0150) (0.0150) (.) (.)
lnunemp 0.5561 0.5561 -3.3041 -3.3041  0.0189 0.0189 -0.0266 -0.0266
 (1.3079) (1.3127) (3.9041) (3.9183)  (0.0392) (0.0394) (.) (.)
lntradeopen -6.6151 -6.6151 18.2059 18.2059  -0.1986 -0.1986 0.0413 0.0413
 (5.6482) (5.6688) (15.3700) (15.4260)  (0.1554) (0.1560) (0.6870) (0.6895)
Observations 160 160 160 160  160 160 160 160
Number of countries 23 23 23 23  23 23 23 23
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) -2.30 -2.30 (.) (.)  -2.62 -2.62 (.) (.)
p value 0.021 0.021 (.) (.)  0.009 0.009 (.) (.)
 Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) -0.50 -0.50 -1.63 -1.63  -0.31 -0.31 (.) (.)
p value 0.618 0.618 0.102 0.102  0.757 0.757 (.) (.)
Sargan test for over 
identification (p-value) 
0.097 0.087 0.097 0.087  0.097 0.087 0.097 0.087
  
Hansen test for over 
identification (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for 
Exogeneity of GMM 
Instruments (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
           
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  System GMM 
 One-step Two-step  One-step Two-step 
 (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (15) (16) 
L.theilt 0.9805*** 0.9706*** 0.7643*** 0.7337***  
 (0.0516) (0.0504) (0.2702) (0.2340)  
L.lntheilt    0.9045*** 0.8895*** 0.8028*** 0.7504***
    (0.1711) (0.1766) (0.1870) (0.2000)
nato  3.6324 20.5006  0.0742 0.2412
  (2.5156) (167.4649)  (0.0810) (0.2948)
lnhealthgov -6.3602 -7.2303 24.2465 20.0057  0.2467 0.2327 0.3242 0.3575
 (5.9130) (6.2052) (49.8469) (40.0554)  (0.2628) (0.2462) (0.3748) (0.3413)
terror -0.0028 -0.0038 0.0424 0.0432  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005
 (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0568) (0.0430)  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007)
lnrgdp -0.2584 -0.4465 -21.0318 -23.2223  -0.0155 -0.0311 -0.0323 -0.1735
 (3.8565) (3.8364) (31.0610) (20.3836)  (0.0745) (0.0777) (0.4136) (0.3888)
tivnet 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0015 0.0015  -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0011)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnapcsale -1.2237* -1.1318* 16.4569 16.7866  0.0218 0.0232 0.0750 0.1124
 (0.6750) (0.6051) (18.2123) (.)  (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.1104) (0.0919)
lnunemp -2.6766 -3.7956 12.4825 9.6090  -0.0300 -0.0663 -0.0512 -0.0997
 (2.6431) (2.7010) (19.7634) (30.0692)  (0.0786) (0.1138) (0.2584) (0.2631)
lntradeopen -5.3763* -5.7719 28.3918 27.7133  -0.0259 -0.0447 0.2611 0.1815
 (3.1136) (3.7381) (32.8232) (29.8534)  (0.0803) (0.0943) (0.2555) (0.3524)
Observations 238 238 238 238  238 238 238 238
Number of countries 24 24 24 24  24 24 24 24
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) -2.29 -2.29 -0.89 -0.88  -1.29 -1.30 -1.00 -1.00
p value 0.022 0.022 0.373 0.381  0.196 0.193 0.319 0.318
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -1.26 -1.27 -1.04 -1.06  -1.15 -1.22 -1.45 -1.31
p value 0.206 0.205 0.299 0.288  0.249 0.221 0.146 0.191
Sargan test for over 
identification (p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.010 0.013 0.010 0.013
  
Hansen test for over 
identification (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for 
Exogeneity of GMM 
Instruments (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
           
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  System GMM 
 One-step Two-step  One-step Two-step 
 (17) (18)  (19) (20)  (21) (22)  (23) (24) 
L.hdi 0.9728*** 0.9646*** 0.6762*** 0.7055*  
 (0.0426) (0.0401) (0.1249) (0.3714)  
L.lnhdi    0.9089*** 0.8980*** 0.8247*** 0.6611
    (0.0584) (0.0558) (0.2012) (0.4880)
nato  0.0026 0.0174  0.0054 0.0207
  (0.0030) (0.0211)  (0.0055) (0.0542)
lnhealthgov 0.0018 0.0021 0.0502 0.0497  0.0198 0.0201 0.0328 0.0629
 (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0375) (0.0606)  (0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0478) (0.1110)
terror 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001** 0.0001  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
lnrgdp 0.0013 0.0007 -0.0173 -0.0140  0.0000 -0.0012 0.0114 -0.0210
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0200) (0.0269)  (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0485) (0.0801)
tivnet 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnapcsale -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0061 0.0050  -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0035 0.0091
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (.) (0.0082)  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0120) (0.0250)
lnunemp -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0129 -0.0195  -0.0081 -0.0095 -0.0114 -0.0090
 (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0196) (0.0330)  (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0421) (0.0362)
lntradeopen 0.0029 0.0027 0.0049 0.0167  0.0048 0.0045 0.0185 0.0279
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0397) (0.0462)  (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0693) (0.0413)
Observations 197 197 197 197  197 197 197 197
Number of countries 24 24 24 24  24 24 24 24
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) -1.83 -1.75 -1.83 -1.61  -0.93 -1.55 -1.20 -0.85
p value 0.068 0.080 0.067 0.107  0.355 0.122 0.228 0.393
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.32 0.27 0.57 0.94  0.16 0.24 0.31 0.54
p value 0.746 0.789 0.566 0.348  0.874 0.807 0.756 0.589
Sargan test for over 
identification (p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  
Hansen test for over 
identification (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for 
Exogeneity of GMM 
Instruments (p-value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
           
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Table 4: difference and system GMM analysis on the dataset 
 
  
5. Discussion 
 
Regarding the effectiveness of LNAPCSALE, it is only significant on the one-step GMM. 
This is still debatable because the one-step GMM causes downward biasness compared 
to the two-step GMM. Additionally, not many explanatory variables show significance. 
It may be due to the limitation of available countries. Generally speaking, panels whose 
N is equal to around 20 for the GMM estimation is considered troublesome. (Roodman 
2009) Even though this research is done on as many as available of variables that are 
taken from the latest data sources, there would be a possibility that another different result 
is led with more available panels. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This research is conducted by the difference and system GMM for unbalanced panel data 
of 22 countries with 10 variables in order to investigate the relationship between military 
expenditure and income inequality from the MIC point of view. The result suggests that 
the negative relationship exists significantly in the difference GMM model where Gini 
coefficient is a dependent variable, and also negative, but a relatively weak relationship 
can be observed by the Theil’s T one-step system GMM. By judging the significance 
level and variable specification, the income-narrowing hypothesis can be supported in 
this research. Not to be argued, although it was a debated matter that the existence of MIC 
so far, this paper put the discussion forward in terms of quantitative aspects.  
It is possible that the result will change because of the lack of a more comprehensive 
dataset. The longer time periods and many numbers of countries allow the future study to 
examine the relationship deeply, but this study opens the way to the MIC approach in 
defense economy, which is relatively abandoned and suggests some hints to important 
findings.  
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